Abstract
The recent agreement to transfer nuclear submarine reactors and technology from two nuclear-weapon states to a non-nuclear-weapon state (AUKUS deal) highlights an unsolved problem in international safeguards: how to safeguard naval reactor fuel while it is on board an operational nuclear submarine. Proposals to extend existing safeguards technologies and practices are complicated by the need for civilian international inspectors to gain access to the interior of the submarine and the reactor compartment, which raises national security concerns. In this Letter we show that implementing safeguards on submarine propulsion reactors using a low-energy antineutrino reactor-off method, between submarine patrols, can by-pass the need for onboard access all together. We find that, using inverse beta decay, detectors can achieve a timely and high level of assurance that a submarine’s nuclear core has not been diverted (detector mass of around 100 kg) nor its enrichment level changed (detector mass of around 10 tons).
- Received 22 November 2021
- Revised 11 February 2022
- Accepted 3 May 2022
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.128.241803
Published by the American Physical Society under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license. Further distribution of this work must maintain attribution to the author(s) and the published article’s title, journal citation, and DOI. Funded by SCOAP3.
Published by the American Physical Society
Physics Subject Headings (PhySH)
synopsis
Tracking Nuclear Material Aboard Submarines
Published 14 June 2022
Monitoring the fissile material aboard nuclear-powered submarines is notoriously difficult. Researchers may now have a way to safeguard this weapons-grade substance.
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