Dependency-based targeted attacks in interdependent networks

Dong Zhou and Amir Bashan
Phys. Rev. E 102, 022301 – Published 3 August 2020

Abstract

Modern large engineered network systems normally work in cooperation and incorporate dependencies between their components for purposes of efficiency and regulation. Such dependencies may become a major risk since they can cause small-scale failures to propagate throughout the system. Thus, the dependent nodes could be a natural target for malicious attacks that aim to exploit these vulnerabilities. Here we consider a type of targeted attack that is based on the dependencies between the networks. We study strategies of attacks that range from dependency-first to dependency-last, where a fraction 1p of the nodes with dependency links, or nodes without dependency links, respectively, are initially attacked. We systematically analyze, both analytically and numerically, the percolation transition of partially interdependent networks, where a fraction q of the nodes in each network are dependent on nodes in the other network. We find that for a broad range of dependency strength q, the “dependency-first” attack strategy is actually less effective, in terms of lower critical percolation threshold pc, compared with random attacks of the same size. In contrast, the “dependency-last” attack strategy is more effective, i.e., higher pc, compared with a random attack. This effect is explained by exploring the dynamics of the cascading failures initiated by dependency-based attacks. We show that while “dependency-first” strategy increases the short-term impact of the initial attack, in the long term the cascade slows down compared with the case of random attacks and vice versa for “dependency-last.” Our results demonstrate that the effectiveness of attack strategies over a system of interdependent networks should be evaluated not only by the immediate impact but mainly by the accumulated damage during the process of cascading failures. This highlights the importance of understanding the dynamics of avalanches that may occur due to different scenarios of failures in order to design resilient critical infrastructures.

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  • Received 27 August 2019
  • Revised 11 March 2020
  • Accepted 16 June 2020

DOI:https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevE.102.022301

©2020 American Physical Society

Physics Subject Headings (PhySH)

Networks

Authors & Affiliations

Dong Zhou1,2 and Amir Bashan3

  • 1School of Reliability and Systems Engineering, Beihang University, Beijing 100191, China
  • 2National Key Laboratory of Science and Technology on Reliability and Environmental Engineering, Beijing 100191, China
  • 3Department of Physics, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan 52900, Israel

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Issue

Vol. 102, Iss. 2 — August 2020

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