Laser-Seeding Attack in Quantum Key Distribution

Anqi Huang, Álvaro Navarrete, Shi-Hai Sun, Poompong Chaiwongkhot, Marcos Curty, and Vadim Makarov
Phys. Rev. Applied 12, 064043 – Published 18 December 2019

Abstract

Quantum key distribution (QKD) based on the laws of quantum physics allows the secure distribution of secret keys over an insecure channel. Unfortunately, imperfect implementations of QKD compromise its information-theoretical security. Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI QKD) is a promising approach to remove all side channels from the measurement unit, which is regarded as the “Achilles’ heel” of QKD. An essential assumption in MDI QKD is, however, that the sources are trusted. Here we experimentally demonstrate that a practical source based on a semiconductor laser diode is vulnerable to a laser-seeding attack, in which light injected from the communication line into the laser results in an increase of the intensities of the prepared states. The unnoticed increase of intensity may compromise the security of QKD, as we show theoretically for the prepare-and-measure decoy-state BB84 and MDI QKD protocols. Our theoretical security analysis is general and can be applied to any vulnerability that increases the intensity of the emitted pulses. Moreover, a laser-seeding attack might be launched as well against decoy-state-based quantum cryptographic protocols beyond QKD.

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  • Received 13 May 2019
  • Revised 5 November 2019
  • Corrected 25 February 2020

DOI:https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevApplied.12.064043

© 2019 American Physical Society

Physics Subject Headings (PhySH)

Quantum Information, Science & Technology

Corrections

25 February 2020

Correction: The order of the affiliation numbers for the sixth author has been reset, and minor fixes to wording in Secs. I and III have been made.

Authors & Affiliations

Anqi Huang1,2,*, Álvaro Navarrete3, Shi-Hai Sun4, Poompong Chaiwongkhot2,5, Marcos Curty3, and Vadim Makarov6,7,8,5

  • 1Institute for Quantum Information & State Key Laboratory of High Performance Computing, College of Computer, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha 410073, People’s Republic of China
  • 2Institute for Quantum Computing, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada N2L 3G1
  • 3EI Telecomunicación, Department of Signal Theory and Communications, University of Vigo, Vigo E-36310, Spain
  • 4School of Physics and Astronomy, Sun Yat-Sen University, Zhuhai 519082, People’s Republic of China
  • 5Department of Physics and Astronomy, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada N2L 3G1
  • 6Russian Quantum Center, Skolkovo, Moscow 121205, Russia
  • 7Shanghai Branch, National Laboratory for Physical Sciences at Microscale and CAS Center for Excellence in Quantum Information, University of Science and Technology of China, Shanghai 201315, People’s Republic of China
  • 8NTI Center for Quantum Communications, National University of Science and Technology MISiS, Moscow 119049, Russia

  • *angelhuang.hn@gmail.com

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Vol. 12, Iss. 6 — December 2019

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