Abstract
Recently, Zou, and Qiu [Phys. Rev. A 82, 042325 (2010)] demonstrated that two arbitrated quantum signature (AQS) schemes are not secure because an arbitrator cannot arbitrate the dispute between two users when a receiver repudiates the integrity of a signature. By using a public board, Zou and Qiu's proposed two AQS schemes to solve the problem. This work shows that the same security problem may exist in Zou and Qiu's schemes. Moreover, a malicious verifier, Bob, can actively negate a signed order if he wants to. This attack, a special case of the denial-of-service (DoS) attack mentioned by Cai [Phys. Rev. Lett. 91, 109801 (2003)], is important in quantum cryptography. Bob may get some benefits from this DoS attack since he can actively deny Alice's signed order without being detected. This work also shows that a malicious signer can reveal the verifier's secret key without being detected by using Trojan-horse attacks.
- Received 11 May 2011
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevA.85.056301
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