Quantum hacking: Experimental demonstration of time-shift attack against practical quantum-key-distribution systems

Yi Zhao, Chi-Hang Fred Fung, Bing Qi, Christine Chen, and Hoi-Kwong Lo
Phys. Rev. A 78, 042333 – Published 28 October 2008

Abstract

Quantum-key-distribution (QKD) systems can send quantum signals over more than 100km standard optical fiber and are widely believed to be secure. Here, we show experimentally a technologically feasible attack—namely, the time-shift attack—against a commercial QKD system. Our result shows that, contrary to popular belief, an eavesdropper, Eve, has a non-negligible probability (4%) to break the security of the system. Eve’s success is due to the well-known detection efficiency loophole in the experimental testing of Bell’s inequalities. Therefore, the detection efficiency loophole plays a key role not only in fundamental physics, but also in technological applications such as QKD systems.

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  • Received 8 August 2007

DOI:https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevA.78.042333

©2008 American Physical Society

Authors & Affiliations

Yi Zhao, Chi-Hang Fred Fung, Bing Qi, Christine Chen, and Hoi-Kwong Lo

  • Center for Quantum Information and Quantum Control, Department of Physics and Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, M5S 3G4, Canada

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Issue

Vol. 78, Iss. 4 — October 2008

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