Noncooperatively Optimized Tolerance: Decentralized Strategic Optimization in Complex Systems

Yevgeniy Vorobeychik, Jackson R. Mayo, Robert C. Armstrong, and Joseph R. Ruthruff
Phys. Rev. Lett. 107, 108702 – Published 1 September 2011
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Abstract

We introduce noncooperatively optimized tolerance (NOT), a game theoretic generalization of highly optimized tolerance (HOT), which we illustrate in the forest fire framework. As the number of players increases, NOT retains features of HOT, such as robustness and self-dissimilar landscapes, but also develops features of self-organized criticality. The system retains considerable robustness even as it becomes fractured, due in part to emergent cooperation between players, and at the same time exhibits increasing resilience against changes in the environment, giving rise to intermediate regimes where the system is robust to a particular distribution of adverse events, yet not very fragile to changes.

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  • Received 30 May 2011

DOI:https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.107.108702

© 2011 American Physical Society

Authors & Affiliations

Yevgeniy Vorobeychik, Jackson R. Mayo, Robert C. Armstrong, and Joseph R. Ruthruff

  • Sandia National Laboratories, Post Office Box 969, Livermore, California 94551-0969, USA

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Vol. 107, Iss. 10 — 2 September 2011

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