Social dilemmas in multistrategy evolutionary potential games

György Szabó and Gergely Bunth
Phys. Rev. E 97, 012305 – Published 11 January 2018

Abstract

The nature of social dilemmas is studied in n-strategy evolutionary potential games on a square lattice with nearest-neighbor interactions and the logit rule. For symmetric games with symmetric payoff matrices there are no dilemmas because of the coincidence of individual and common interests. The dilemmas are caused by the antisymmetric parts of the self- and cross-dependent payoff components if it modifies the preferred Nash equilibrium. The contentment of players and the emergence of dilemmas in the preferred Nash equilibria are illustrated on some two-dimensional cross sections of the parameter space.

  • Figure
  • Figure
  • Figure
  • Figure
  • Figure
  • Figure
  • Figure
1 More
  • Received 30 October 2017

DOI:https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevE.97.012305

©2018 American Physical Society

Physics Subject Headings (PhySH)

  1. Physical Systems
Statistical Physics & ThermodynamicsInterdisciplinary PhysicsPhysics of Living Systems

Authors & Affiliations

György Szabó*

  • Institute of Technical Physics and Materials Science, Centre for Energy Research, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, P.O. Box 49, H-1525 Budapest, Hungary

Gergely Bunth

  • Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Budafoki út 8, H-1111 Budapest, Hungary

  • *szabo@mfa.kfki.hu
  • gbunthy@gmail.com

Article Text (Subscription Required)

Click to Expand

References (Subscription Required)

Click to Expand
Issue

Vol. 97, Iss. 1 — January 2018

Reuse & Permissions
Access Options
Author publication services for translation and copyediting assistance advertisement

Authorization Required


×
×

Images

×

Sign up to receive regular email alerts from Physical Review E

Log In

Cancel
×

Search


Article Lookup

Paste a citation or DOI

Enter a citation
×