Alliance formation with exclusion in the spatial public goods game

Attila Szolnoki and Xiaojie Chen
Phys. Rev. E 95, 052316 – Published 22 May 2017

Abstract

Detecting defection and alarming partners about the possible danger could be essential to avoid being exploited. This act, however, may require a huge individual effort from those who take this job, hence such a strategy seems to be unfavorable. But structured populations can provide an opportunity where a largely unselfish excluder strategy can form an effective alliance with other cooperative strategies, hence they can sweep out defection. Interestingly, this alliance is functioning even at the extremely high cost of exclusion where the sole application of an exclusion strategy would be harmful otherwise. These results may explain why the emergence of extreme selfless behavior is not necessarily against individual selection but could be the result of an evolutionary process.

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  • Received 2 March 2017

DOI:https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevE.95.052316

©2017 American Physical Society

Physics Subject Headings (PhySH)

Interdisciplinary Physics

Authors & Affiliations

Attila Szolnoki1,* and Xiaojie Chen2,†

  • 1Institute of Technical Physics and Materials Science, Centre for Energy Research, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, P.O. Box 49, H-1525 Budapest, Hungary
  • 2School of Mathematical Sciences, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 611731, China

  • *szolnoki@mfa.kfki.hu
  • xiaojiechen@uestc.edu.cn

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Vol. 95, Iss. 5 — May 2017

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