Optimal dynamic incentive scheduling for Hawk-Dove evolutionary games

K. Stuckey, R. Dua, Y. Ma, J. Parker, and P. K. Newton
Phys. Rev. E 105, 014412 – Published 21 January 2022

Abstract

The Hawk-Dove evolutionary game offers a paradigm of the trade-offs associated with aggressive and passive behaviors. When two (or more) populations of players compete, their success or failure is measured by their frequency in the population, and the system is governed by the replicator dynamics. We develop a time-dependent optimal-adaptive control theory for this dynamical system in which the entries of the payoff matrix are dynamically altered to produce control schedules that minimize and maximize the aggressive population through a finite-time cycle. These schedules provide upper and lower bounds on the outcomes for all possible strategies since they represent two extremizers of the cost function. We then adaptively extend the optimal control schedules over multiple cycles to produce absolute maximizers and minimizers for the system.

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  • Received 21 September 2021
  • Accepted 5 January 2022

DOI:https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevE.105.014412

©2022 American Physical Society

Physics Subject Headings (PhySH)

Nonlinear DynamicsPhysics of Living Systems

Authors & Affiliations

K. Stuckey*

  • Department of Aerospace & Mechanical Engineering, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California 90089-1191, USA

R. Dua

  • Department of Mathematics, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California 90089-1191, USA

Y. Ma

  • Department of Physics & Astronomy, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California 90089-1191, USA

J. Parker§

  • Division of Biology and Biological Engineering, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California 91125, USA

P. K. Newton

  • Department of Aerospace & Mechanical Engineering, Mathematics, and The Ellison Institute, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California 90089-1191, USA

  • *kstuckey@usc.edu
  • rajvirdu@usc.edu
  • yongqiam@usc.edu
  • §joep@caltech.edu
  • Corresponding author: newton@usc.edu

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Vol. 105, Iss. 1 — January 2022

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