Abstract
A big challenge in continuous-variable quantum key distribution is to prove security against arbitrary coherent attacks including realistic assumptions such as finite-size effects. Recently, such a proof has been presented in [Phys. Rev. Lett. 109, 100502 (2012)] for a two-mode squeezed state protocol based on a novel uncertainty relation with quantum memories. But the transmission distances were fairly limited due to a direct reconciliation protocol. We prove here security against coherent attacks of a reverse-reconciliation protocol under similar assumptions but allowing distances of over 16 km for experimentally feasible parameters. We further clarify the limitations when using the uncertainty relation with quantum memories in security proofs of continuous-variable quantum key distribution.
- Received 2 July 2014
- Revised 21 September 2014
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevA.90.042325
©2014 American Physical Society