Coherent-pulse implementations of quantum cryptography protocols resistant to photon-number-splitting attacks

Antonio Acín, Nicolas Gisin, and Valerio Scarani
Phys. Rev. A 69, 012309 – Published 15 January 2004
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Abstract

We propose a class of quantum cryptography protocols that are robust against photon-number-splitting attacks (PNS) in a weak coherent-pulse implementation. We give a quite exhaustive analysis of several eavesdropping attacks on these schemes. The honest parties (Alice and Bob) use present-day technology, in particular an attenuated laser as an approximation of a single-photon source. The idea of the protocols is to exploit the nonorthogonality of quantum states to decrease the information accessible to Eve due to the multiphoton pulses produced by the imperfect source. The distance at which the key distribution becomes insecure due to the PNS attack is significantly increased compared to the existing schemes. We also show that strong-pulse implementations, where a strong pulse is included as a reference, allow for key distribution robust against photon-number-splitting attacks.

  • Received 20 February 2003

DOI:https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevA.69.012309

©2004 American Physical Society

Authors & Affiliations

Antonio Acín, Nicolas Gisin, and Valerio Scarani

  • Group of Applied Physics, University of Geneva, 20, rue de l’Ecole-de-Médecine, CH-1211 Geneva 4, Switzerland

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Issue

Vol. 69, Iss. 1 — January 2004

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