Scale-Free Networks Provide a Unifying Framework for the Emergence of Cooperation

F. C. Santos and J. M. Pacheco
Phys. Rev. Lett. 95, 098104 – Published 26 August 2005

Abstract

We study the evolution of cooperation in the framework of evolutionary game theory, adopting the prisoner’s dilemma and snowdrift game as metaphors of cooperation between unrelated individuals. In sharp contrast with previous results we find that, whenever individuals interact following networks of contacts generated via growth and preferential attachment, leading to strong correlations between individuals, cooperation becomes the dominating trait throughout the entire range of parameters of both games, as such providing a unifying framework for the emergence of cooperation. Such emergence is shown to be inhibited whenever the correlations between individuals are decreased or removed. These results are shown to apply from very large population sizes down to small communities with nearly 100 individuals.

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  • Received 23 November 2004

DOI:https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.95.098104

©2005 American Physical Society

Authors & Affiliations

F. C. Santos1 and J. M. Pacheco2,1

  • 1GADGET, Apartado 1329, 1009-001 Lisboa, Portugal
  • 2Centro de Física Teórica e Computacional and Departamento de Física da Faculdade de Ciências, P-1649-003 Lisboa Codex, Portugal

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Issue

Vol. 95, Iss. 9 — 26 August 2005

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