Continuous-Variable Quantum Cryptography is Secure against Non-Gaussian Attacks

Frédéric Grosshans and Nicolas J. Cerf
Phys. Rev. Lett. 92, 047905 – Published 30 January 2004

Abstract

A general study of arbitrary finite-size coherent attacks against continuous-variable quantum cryptographic schemes is presented. It is shown that, if the size of the blocks that can be coherently attacked by an eavesdropper is fixed and much smaller than the key size, then the optimal attack for a given signal-to-noise ratio in the transmission line is an individual Gaussian attack. Consequently, non-Gaussian coherent attacks do not need to be considered in the security analysis of such quantum cryptosystems.

  • Figure
  • Received 8 October 2003

DOI:https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.92.047905

©2004 American Physical Society

Authors & Affiliations

Frédéric Grosshans and Nicolas J. Cerf

  • Quantum Information and Communication, École Polytechnique, CP 165, Université Libre de Bruxelles, B-1050 Brussels, Belgium

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Issue

Vol. 92, Iss. 4 — 30 January 2004

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