Simple Proof of Security of the BB84 Quantum Key Distribution Protocol

Peter W. Shor and John Preskill
Phys. Rev. Lett. 85, 441 – Published 10 July 2000
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Abstract

We prove that the 1984 protocol of Bennett and Brassard (BB84) for quantum key distribution is secure. We first give a key distribution protocol based on entanglement purification, which can be proven secure using methods from Lo and Chau's proof of security for a similar protocol. We then show that the security of this protocol implies the security of BB84. The entanglement purification based protocol uses Calderbank-Shor-Steane codes, and properties of these codes are used to remove the use of quantum computation from the Lo-Chau protocol.

  • Received 28 February 2000

DOI:https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.85.441

©2000 American Physical Society

Authors & Affiliations

Peter W. Shor1 and John Preskill2

  • 1AT&T Labs Research, Florham Park, New Jersey 07932
  • 2Lauritsen Laboratory of High Energy Physics, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California 91125

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Vol. 85, Iss. 2 — 10 July 2000

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