Cryptography from Noisy Storage

Stephanie Wehner, Christian Schaffner, and Barbara M. Terhal
Phys. Rev. Lett. 100, 220502 – Published 5 June 2008

Abstract

We show how to implement cryptographic primitives based on the realistic assumption that quantum storage of qubits is noisy. We thereby consider individual-storage attacks; i.e., the dishonest party attempts to store each incoming qubit separately. Our model is similar to the model of bounded-quantum storage; however, we consider an explicit noise model inspired by present-day technology. To illustrate the power of this new model, we show that a protocol for oblivious transfer is secure for any amount of quantum-storage noise, as long as honest players can perform perfect quantum operations. Our model also allows us to show the security of protocols that cope with noise in the operations of the honest players and achieve more advanced tasks such as secure identification.

  • Figure
  • Received 8 January 2008

DOI:https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.100.220502

©2008 American Physical Society

Authors & Affiliations

Stephanie Wehner1, Christian Schaffner1, and Barbara M. Terhal2

  • 1CWI, Kruislaan 413, 1098 SJ Amsterdam, The Netherlands
  • 2IBM, Watson Research Center, P.O. Box 218, Yorktown Heights, New York, USA

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Issue

Vol. 100, Iss. 22 — 6 June 2008

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